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of the
STATE OF UTAH
MEREDITH PAGE and MAURINE S. PAGE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs

)
)

Case N(

)

FEDERAL SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY
'
a Utah corporation,

8815

)
)

Defendant and Appellant,

---------------------------------------)
PETITION FOR REHEARING

-----------

Comes now the above named defendant-appeH
and petitions this Honorable Court for rehearing
the above entitled cause, and for an order vacati1
the denial of the appeal and affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court.
This pet it ion is based upon the points eet
forth in the defendant-appellant's brief lierein.

We do hereby certify that in our opinion tl
is good cause to believe that the judgment obje~t~
is erroneous and that the case should be reexWDI
as prayed in said petition.
Dated January
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

MEREDITH PAGE and MAURINE S.
PAGE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No.
8815

vs.
FEDERAL SECURITY INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

CARDINAL POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE
COURT IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
REHEARING IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CAUSE
OF ACTION.

The defendant and appellant respectfully submits to this
Honorable Court its contentions as to why the petition for
3
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rehearing should be granted and the matter resubmitted for
further consideration.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point One. The Court erred in its decision wherein it
stated that, according to her testimony, the widow of the deceased insured should have had the policy in her possession.
Point Two. The Court erred in its decision wherein it
is stated that the defendant company claimed to have notified
the reinsurer, Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, of
the conversion of the policy to a paid-up policy.
Point Three. The Defendant-Appellant based its challenge to the jury's verdict not only on the testimony of the
witnesses, but also on the written documentary evidence which
was uncontradicted and certainly credible evidence, and which
the jury arbitrarily disregarded.
Point Four. The entire records of the defendant company,
together with the corroborating testimony of the witnesses,
established that as a matter of law the deceased insured had
elected one of the options under the policy.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION WHEREIN
IT STATED THAT, ACCORDING TO HER TESTIMONY,
THE WIDOW OF THE DECEASED INSURED SHOULD
HAVE HAD THE POLICY IN HER POSSESSION.

4
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In the Court's opinion, it is stated:
"It is also significant that, according to her testimony,
she received the policy in the mail after these talks, and
therefore would have had it in her possession. Yet
after her husband's death she * * * did not have the
policy, nor did she have either the rider or the accompanying letter, which the company claimed were sent."

The testimony shows that the decedent's widow, Ruth
Jensen Page, did not claim to have had the policy in her possession at any time, except briefly when it was first returned
by the insurance company.

"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) Now, after the policy came
back from the Insurance Company like you said
you wanted, what did you do with the life insurance policy ?
A. (Ruth Jensen Page) My husband had it.
Q. What did he do with it?
A. Do with it?
Q. Where did he put it?
A. I don't know whether we had it or his dad had it.
We used to keep it in the safety box."
Recotrd, 27-28
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes )Then, the next time you saw
this policy was after your husband's death, on the
22nd day of April, 1957, is that correct, when they
showed it to you, when Mr. Rannow showed it to
you?
A. (Mrs. Page) Yes."
Record, 28
The testimony of Meredith Page, one of the plaintiffs
herein, was to the effect that the policy was in his safe at his
home on the date of the death of the insured. (Record 95).
5
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In the light of the testimony of Ruth Jensen Page and
Meredith Page, we submit that there is no basis for the Court's
contention that, according to her testimony, the widow should
have had the policy in her possession when her husband died.
We further submit that in the light of the testimony, there
is but one conclusion to be reached, that is to say, that the letter
of transmittal and the rider would be with the policy, and it is
undisputed that this policy was, at the time of the insured's
death, in the possession of the plaintiff, Meredith' Page.

POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION WHEREIN IT
IS STATED THAT THE DEFENDANT COMPANY
CLAIMED TO HAVE NOTIFIED THE REINSURER, LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, OF
THE CONVERSION OF THE POLICY TO A PAID-UP
POLICY.
The record shows that the defendant insurance company,
throughout the entire trial, contended that the Lincoln National
Life Insurance Company was not notified of the conversion
of the policy in question to a paid-up policy, on the ground
and for the reason that such information was not required to be
sent and was not, in fact, sent to the Lincoln National Life.

"Q. (Mr. Ronnow)

Did you at any time after this
alleged election advise Lincoln National that the
policy has been changed from a current policy to
one of paid-up in the sum of $1443.00?
6
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A. (Erich Olschewski) We advised termination.
Q. You advised termination, is that correct? Did you
advise them as to the election of one of these
clauses?
A. No, we did not explain then."
Record, 64

"Q. (Mr. Ronnow) * * *You asked Lincoln National
to terminate their insurance on this policy?
A. (Mr. Olschewski) Yes.
Q. Did you write them a letter?

A. No. That is done by the clerk who handled it once
a month with other cases that might be terminated."
Record, 64

"Q. (Mr. Ronnow) I show you what has been marked
as Exhibit 6, and will you tell us what type of
statement it is?
A. (Mr. Olschewski) This is the notice to the reinsurance company advising them of discontinuance
of the premium payment for reinsurance payment
and to request a refund if any refund is due on any
unearned payment in the case of Alma M. Page.
Q. If Mr. Page did not pay any premium after the
middle of 1955, his policy would be listed on such
a report, would it not?

A. Yes.
Q. And his policy would be listed there irregardless
of whether he had elected any of these options or
failed to pay his premium and made no election?
A. No."

Record, 65, 66
7
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The record discloses in detail the extensive procedure
involved in the notification of the Lincoln National, the reinsureL Nowhere in the record do any of the defendant's
witnesses state that they notified Lincoln National of any
election of any of the options covered by the policy.
What was actually done, was that on September 16, 1955,
the Lincoln National was notified that the Alma Page policy
was "lapsed" as fat as Lincoln National Life was concerned.
It must be borne in mind, and the record so shows, that the
reinsurance policy with Lincoln National had been paid for
one year in advance, that is to say, from the 15th day of
December, 1954, to December 15, 1955, as had the premium
to the defendant company.
Therefore, the defendant had notified the Lincoln National of a premium rebate dating from July 15, 1955 to
Pecember 15, 1955. The explanation of the dating back to
July 15 was stated by Mr. Olschewski as shown at Record 71,
wherein it was pointed out that the 31-day grace period was
taken into consideration in dating back the "lapsed" date, as
far as· the Lincoln National was concerned, from the date of
the election by Alma Page in August, to July.
This statement is substantiated by plaintiff's Exhibit 13
(telegram from Lincoln National).
The date of September 16 was merely the date when
request was made for rebate from Lincoln.
It should be remembered that the policy in question was
paid up .until December 15, 1955, and the defendant company
could not have treated the policy as lapsed if it were not for
the fact that an election had been made by the insured.
8
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POINT THREE
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BASED ITS CHALLENGE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT NOT ONLY ON THE
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES, BUT ALSO ON THE
WRITTEN DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH WAS
UNCONTRADICTED AND CERTAINLY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, AND WHICH THE JURY ARBITRARILY DISREGARDED.
Defendant's Exhibit 10, a letter dated August 3, 1955,
from the defendant to the insured and his wife, contains the
following paragraph relating to the insurance policy:
"We shall continue to hold your policy in our possession until we hear from you.''
Exhibit 10 was in the possession of the decedent's widow,
Ruth Jensen Page. The plaintiffs did not attempt to contradict
this letter nor in any way contradict the testimony of Mrs.
Page that she and her husband received that letter. This
documentary evidence establishes beyond any doubt that the
company had the insurance policy in its possession on the 3rd
day of August, 1955.
Can the jury arbitrarily disregard this evidence?
Defendant's Exhibit 12 is a carbon copy of a letter of
transmittal from the defendant to the insured, which shows
the return of the insurance policy to the insured. This exhibit
was attacked by plaintiffs, not on the ground that it was
fraudulent or that it was prepared at some time other than
that testified to by the defendant's witnesses, but on the
ground that there was no direct evidence that it had been
received.
9
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The uncontradicted testimony of Merle Thomas Olschewski shows that the letter was dictated to her by Mr. Olschewski,
that she took it down by shorthand, transcribed it from her
notes, typed the letter, addressed the envelope, placed the
letter in the envelope, stamped it and mailed it to Mr. Alma
Page at Riverton, Utah. (R. 84 through 87).
"The mailing of a letter postpaid, and properly addressed to a person shown to reside in a city or town
to which the letter was addressed, creates no legal presumption, but a presumption or inference of fact, that
it reached its destination."
Campbell v. Gowans et al
35 U. 268, 100 P. 397
''A writing or document made contemporaneously
with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts,
is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of
greater probative force than the oral testimony of a
witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection."
20 Am. Jur. 1029
Evidence, Sec. 1179
It is to be observed that the oral testimony did not conflict with the written documentary evidence, but clearly
paralleled the writing in every respect. There being no contradictory testimony, this evidence stands as uncontradicted
evidence, and to allow a jury to pass upon such evidence which
stands· unimpeached and uncontradicted by any means, is, we
submit, to allow the jury to resort to speculation, conjecture,
surmise, guess and supposition.

The uncontradicted documentary evidence cannot be said
to stand in the same position as the testimony of an interested
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

witness, which the court alleges Ruth Jensen Page (the widow)
to be. We submit that where a witness who might have some
interest testifies to facts which are borne out by uncontradicted
documentary evidence, such facts stand as established, and a
jury should not be allowed to speculate.
The court points out that the widow was a recent immigrant to the United States, who admitted that she experienced
some difficulty in understanding insurance matters. Certainly,
it cannot be doubted that she knew that she and her husband
went to the company's office to make an election. We submit
that it was not proper to permit the jury to decide this fact,
as there was no evidence at all to the effect that the insured
and the witness. did not go to the company offices, but on
the contrary, there are three witnesses and two documents
to establish the fact. It cannot be doubted that the various
options contained in the policy were discussed, and this evidence, being uncontradicted, should not have been left to
speculation on the part of the jury.
For a woman who did not understand insurance, the
widow gave a definition of "paid-up insurance" which would
put many natives to shame.
"Q. (.Mr. Bushnell) Mrs. Page, will you state what
you understand to be meant by the term paid-up
insurance?
A. Amount that would be left over when we stopped
payments, and we owed on the insurance, I understand, $400. for payment and then we deduct that
from it and then that paid-up insurance is all that
would be on the insurance if anything happened."
R. 29, 30
11
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Mrs. Page was asked one question on re-direct examination
as follows:

"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) Mrs. Page, do you remember
the amount of insurance on the paid-up insurance
policy?
A. One thousand four hundred something."
R. 32
In the light of this evidence and all other uncontradicted
evidence introduced in the case, this matter should not have
been submitted to a jury and the jury permitted to speculate,
in view of the decisions regarding speculation by juries, which
this jurisdiction recognizes and purports to follow:
"The general rule that the credibility of witnesses
is a question for a jury alone does not mean that the
jury is at liberty, under the guise of passing upon the
credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony when
from no reasonable point of view it is open to doubt.··
Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. vs. Martin, 1931,
283 U. S. 209, 75 L. Ed. 983
51 S. Ct. 45 3, 62 A.L.R. 2d 1192, 1201
The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in the case of Beck
vs. Givens, 1957, ____ Wyoming ____ , 309 P.2d 715, 313 P.2d
977, held that while the trier of facts should be accorded great
freedom in evaluating testimony it should not arbitrarily disregard the undisputed testimony of a witness in the absence
of evasiveness, equivocation, improbability or impossibility.
In the annotation in 62 A.L.R. 2d 1192, many cases are
cited in support of the proposition that juries may not arbitrarily disregard testimony which is not contradicted nor in
any way discredited.
12
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"But when the testimony of witnesses, interested
in the event or otherwise, is clear and convincing, not
incredible in the light of general knowledge ~nd
common experience, not extraordinary, not contradicted in any way by witnesses or circumstances, and so
plain and complete that disbelief of the story could
not reasonably arise in the rational process of an ordinarily intelligent mind, then a question has been presented for the· court- to decide and not the jury."
(Citing cases.)
c

Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins. Co.
22 N. ]. 482, 126 A2d 323 .62 A.L.R.
2d 1179, 1187
1

"Where the positive testimony of a witness is uncontradicted and unimpeached, either by other positive
testimony or by circumstantial evidence, either extrinsic or intrinsic, it cannot be disregarded, but must
control the decision of the court or ·jury."
62 A.L.R. 2d 1197, citing
Anderson, v. Liljengren
50 Minn. 3, 52 N.W. 219
;,

·'

We submit that the only contradiction in the whole
record, as we view it, is that Mr. Page, one of the plaintiffs
herein, testified that the policy had been in his strong box ever
since it was issued.

"Q. (Mr. Cotro~Manes) All right, you stated a minute
ago that you have a strong box at yot;1r. home, 1s
that correct?
A. Yes.·

Q. And that the policy had been inside that box ever
since it was issued?
A. That is right.

13
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Q. And your son never had the combination to it?

A. That is right.
Q. All this time the policy was in this box?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever give it to your son?
A. I have never given it to my son."
R. 102

All the documentary evidence and the testimony of all
of the defendant's witnesses show that the policy in question
was delivered to the defendant insurance company, and that
the defendant, on August 3, 1955, advised the insured and
his wife:
"We shall continue to hold your policy in our possession until we hear from you."
Defendant's Exhibit 10
Further, the defendant, in its communication to the
insured, dated August 15, 1955, stated:
" ... we return herewith your policy No. 20 PLB3101."

Defendant's Exhibit 12
The court, in its decision, states, inter alia:
"Meredith Page further testified that after Alma's
death he telephoned the defendant's office and the
person answering for the company, upon being advised
of Alma's death, took several minutes to check into the
matter and told him that according to their records
he and his wife as beneficiaries, were entitled to the
full face amount, of the policy, minus a $400.00 loan."
The record shows, with regard to this telephone call:
14
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"Q. (Mr. Bushnell) Take your time, Mr. Page. After
you identified the policy and told her why you were
calling, was there any discussion concerning forms
or items on the policy or things of that kind ?

*

*

*

*

A. She said that the forms would be mailed out for
the death claim of the policy, and then I said how
much would be the amount and she said it was less
the $400.00 * * * ."
R. 97.
At the time this phone call was made, Mr. Page, the
witness, haq before him the insurance policy showing on its
face the amount of $11,682.00, unless the rider showing the
election was attached. In all sincerity, we ask: Why, when
he had the policy before' him, was it necessa!y foi Mr. Page
to telephone the company and ask a clerk, "How much would
be the amount"? Is is not logical to conclude that the rider
was attached to the policy, as testified by the other witnesses,
and that Mr. Page, having doubts, 'called the , defendant's
office to ascertain vyhat it meant?
Further, it was his own counsel who put the amount in
Mr. Page's mouth, when he asked:

"Q. (Mr. Bushnell) When you say the amount here
are you talking about the fac,e amount of $11,682 ?"
R. 97, 98
Nowhere in the whole record does it show that anyone
ever actually told Mr. Page that he was entitled to $11,682.00
less the loan.

15
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POINT FOUR
THE El\TTIRE RECORDS OF THE DEFENDANT
COMPANY, TOGETHER WITH THE CORROBORATING
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES, ESTABLISHED THAT
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE DECEASED INSURED
HAD ELECTED ONE OF THE OPTIONS UNDER THE
POLICY.

At the time of the offering of the various company records,
the plaintiffs' counsel stated:
"Mr. Bushnell: Let's stop there because I object: If
Your Honor please, in connection with exhibits 2
through 9 for the purpose of this motion, the plaintiff
is willing to still say that if witnesses were called from
the office of the defendant, they would testify that
these are the business documents, business entries in
the usual course of their business and for this motion
we have not inisted upon any foundation and if he
therefore makes his motion as to these numbered exhibits, they were not offered at the time of the pretrial when they easily could have been offered, and we
object to their introduction at this time."
R. 17
The exhibits in question, 2, 3, 4, and 9, were admitted
by the court, and therefore plaintiffs' admissions as to the fact
that they were prepared in the usual course of business precludes any challenge by the jury as to their authenticity or
to their content.
These exhibits show that certain entries were made, and
as they were made in the normal course of business, the undisputed presumption is that the entries were made at the
16
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time of the event, in this case, the election of the option by
the insured.
This undisputed documentary evidence may not be ignored
by the jury, nor can the jury be permitted to speculate upon
its content. As a matter of law, inasmuch as the entries were
not challenged, but on the contrary were admitted to have
been made in the course of business, these documents stand
as establishing the facts stated thereon.

CONCLUSION
We submit that the court erred in not taking into consideration that unless an election had been made previously,
when the insured, Alma M. Page, received a check (Defendant's Exhibit 9) for a $4.75 dividend, he would not have cashed
the check, but on the contrary would have inquired why a
$4.75 dividend only, when the previous dividend for the first
half of 1955 had been $56.00, and for the full year of 1954
was $85.98. (See Defendant's Exhibit 4).
The court makes a point regarding the eyelets in the
insurance policy, Exhibit
However, the court failed to take
into consideration the fact that the photostatic copies of the
application, Part I and Part II, which had been attached to
the insurance policy by an eyelet located in the center of the
policy, were forcibly removed by someone, as the mute evidence
will indicate.

1:

We submit, that although the record is silent as to who
detached the photostats, the evidence is conclusive that the
insured or the beneficiary, Meredith Page, had the policy
17
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in his possession after the 15th day of August, 1955, until the
same was presented as an exhibit in this matter.
We submit, further, that nowhere in the record did the
plaintiffs attempt to show that the widow, Ruth Jensen Page,
had any feelings, bias, prejudice or interest in this matter
whatsoever. The first attempt to raise this issue was during
the arguments before the Supreme Court, when Counsel for
plaintiffs admitted that the question had not been raised at
the time of the trial.
The court itself has now resorted to conjecture and speculation which is completely without the evidence, testimony
and case, in an attempt to show that the widow might have
been interested or have had a bias or prejudice to the outcome
of the trial. It is to be noted that this woman was a recent
convert to the LDS Church, and it is extremely unlikely that
one so recently converted to religion would violate the oath
which she took to God.
We respectfully submit that the petition for rehearing
should be granted, and the court should reconsider its decision
in the true light of all of the evidence in order that justice
may prevail and there will no longer be an inference that the
officers of the defendant company deliberately perjured themselves, altered their records, created false evidence, and connived to defeat an obligation, as is now drawn from the court's
decision.
Respectfully submitted,
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
18
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